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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

C. I. LEWIS'S ESTHETICS

THE value theory, developed in Book III of *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*,[1] is on one crucial point utterly misleading. In the very first sentence of Book III, Lewis asserts that "evaluations are a form of empirical knowledge, not fundamentally different from other kinds of empirical knowledge" (p. 365). The reader assumes that what are called evaluations in common usage will either be presented as forms of empirical knowledge or be dismissed as somehow meaningless. Because, in common usage, ethical judgments are considered evaluations, one supposes that these judgments will be treated as a species of the genus of evaluation. In one chapter after another, Lewis encourages this supposition. In one paragraph where he specifically mentions ethical judgments (p. 398), he goes on to condemn Protagorean relativism and the cynicism of neopositivism (p. 399). He thus encourages the belief that he will provide some alternative to the Protagorean and neopositivist ethics. Again he speaks of three human attitudes, the moral and cognitive and esthetic, as though there were no others and as though his account of valuation were to be adequate for all (pp. 437 f.). To the moral attitude, he devotes the whole of one chapter (XVI), and he undertakes to show that moral judgments can be empirically tested by their reference to experienced satisfactions in the whole of life (pp. 486, 503, 510). An ethics, one supposes at this point, would merely deal in greater detail with issues raised by specific moral evaluations. Only at the very end of his book does he make it clear that he considers moral evaluations to be different in kind from ethical ones and that he has not intended to treat ethical judgments at all. "Questions of evaluation and those of ethics must be distinguished rather than identified. Valuation is always a matter of empirical knowledge. But what is right and what is just, can never be determined by empirical facts alone" (p. 554).

Lewis offers no ethics in the sense in which he himself conceives an ethics to be possible and necessary. At one point, speaking of justice (p. 482), he suggests that ethical principles are *analytic;* and on his view, of course, analytic statements can be false (p.

[1] C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1946.

378). It would be easy to conclude that Lewis supposes an ethics to consist of a set of analytic rules which can in principle be tested and which are to be accepted as true unless empirical procedures in fact prove them to be false. But Lewis no more than barely suggests this theory, and may not in fact have intended to suggest it. Unless it could somehow be proved false, an analytic ethical rule would not be a form of empirical knowledge. But so far as Lewis has shown, such a rule could be proved false only by showing that action in accordance with it does not realize happiness or satisfaction. At the same time, Lewis seems to want an ethics which is Kantian in the sense of requiring at times the sacrifice of happiness and personal satisfaction, and rules requiring such sacrifice could obviously not be proved false by their failure to secure what they insist must be sacrificed. Lewis seems clearly in need of a synthetic *a priori* principle furnishing categorical imperatives for ethics. In his final and radical distinction between questions of evaluation and questions of ethics, he seems fully aware of this. What is misleading are his frequent expressions of a profound conviction that ethical judgments are forms of knowledge even though they are not forms of empirical knowledge.

The problem may be put thus: If Lewis has an ethics, it is so inadequately developed and presented in the Carus Lectures that it can not be properly assessed. But there is good reason to believe that Lewis's ethics can not be developed within the theoretical structure provided in the account of valuation, and there is reason to suppose even that Lewis does not intend to present an ethics. Lewis's value theory is clearly and fundamentally an esthetics. As an esthetics, it must be examined and tested.

II

Lewis's esthetics combines two theories, either of which can be examined apart from the other. First, there is the theory of empirical knowledge developed at great length in Books I and II of the *Analysis*. Second, there is the theory of intrinsic and extrinsic value, judgments of which are forms of empirical knowledge. Of these two theories, the first will here be examined only in its special relevance to evaluations as empirical statements; that is, in its application to judgments of intrinsic and extrinsic value. Exposition and criticism will focus, therefore, upon the value theory; and the remainder of this section of the essay will be devoted wholly to the exposition of this theory.

For Lewis, intrinsic value is immediately felt satisfaction (pp. 403–405). "The only thing intrinsically valuable—valuable for

its own sake—is a goodness immediately found or findable and unmistakable when disclosed; all values of any other sort, including all values attributable to objects, are extrinsic, and valued for the sake of their possible contribution to such realizations of the immediately good" (p. 397). Such experience of intrinsic good is non-cognitive, and the directly apprehended satisfaction is final and indubitable (pp. 365, 374, 407). "Good!" "Fine!" "Wonderful!"—all these are emotively expressive utterances, indicative of an immediately felt satisfaction; and no such utterance is a judgment (p. 374). Felt satisfaction, normally expressed in this manner, occurs always as a single aspect or mode of an experience whose other aspect can be described in non-value terms. Values "can be realized or contemplated only as characters of something in particular, or of some particular kind of thing" (p. 369). Intrinsic value is thus an aspect of the phenomenally given, and the given in both its value and non-value aspect is directly apprehended in an experience which is non-cognitive and non-judgmental. The esthetic attitude is one of contemplative absorption in intrinsic value (pp. 439 f.).

Value judgments, evaluations as forms of empirical knowledge, occur only where the attitude is both cognitive and moral. In an experience of this kind, where judgment does or can occur, attention is directed to the future and the whole. The esthetic attitude is characterized by contemplative absorption; the moral and cognitive attitude is characterized by concern for the overall economy of values (p. 481). As rational, men must be concerned to secure and maintain a maximum of felt satisfaction in the whole of life. Men reflect upon their non-cognitive experiences of felt satisfaction, compare one with another as greater or less, make predictions concerning the occurrence and conditions of future intrinsic goods, and act upon these predictions (pp. 365 f., 480 f.). Lewis, in his discussion of this, insists that it is a categorical imperative, as the very "root of all reason," that a man be concerned about his values in the future and on the whole.[2] This concern and the reflection which is a necessary part of it is evaluation. As formulated or stated, the evaluations are judgments, empirically verifiable predictions, and so forms of empirical knowledge.

Lewis's account of evaluations as forms of empirical knowledge parallels precisely his general account of judgments. Value judg-

[2] To call this imperative "*categorical*," as Lewis does, is misleading; for in the Kantian terminology, Lewis's imperative is simply a *hypothetical imperative* of practical reason or of prudence. Happiness (however this be conceived) having been chosen as an end, then the means to and the constituents of happiness must necessarily be chosen. But this imperative is not categorical as enjoining action for its own sake irrespective of any end whatsoever.

ments are of two kinds: First, terminating judgments predict the occurrence of intrinsic value in some specific circumstances. If in these circumstances as defined by the non-value aspect of the experience, the satisfaction occurs, then the judgment is true. If the satisfaction does not occur, the evaluation is false. Prior to its actual test, the evidence in support of a terminating judgment consists of those experiences in which the felt satisfaction predicted has in fact occurred in conjunction with these circumstances. To make a terminating judgment is thus to recognize and identify the non-value aspects of some specific intrinsic value experience. The non-terminating judgment is concerned with these non-value aspects. It predicts that these non-value constituents of an experience have extrinsic value; that is, these constituents are asserted to have a potentiality for occasioning felt satisfaction and are chosen for the sake of this satisfaction. Non-terminating judgments can never be more than probable. Their probability is calculated by the frequency with which terminating judgments, based upon them, are in fact verified as true or false. Thus a non-terminating esthetic judgment claims some probably extrinsic value for some specific esthetic object. A terminating judgment predicts that felt satisfaction will occur upon the presentation of this object in experience. The probability of the non-terminating judgment is increased or decreased as the corresponding terminating judgments are proved true or false (pp. 365, 375 f.).

III

Of the three fundamental critical questions which can be raised concerning this much of Lewis's theory, one can be quickly disposed of. Lewis's account of valuation is strictly consistent with his general account of empirical knowledge. Terminating and non-terminating value judgments have the form and significance of terminating and non-terminating judgments in science and common sense (pp. 182–185). On Lewis's epistemology, all empirical knowledge must be based ultimately upon some directly apprehended and indubitable data (pp. 171–172). For evaluations, these data are felt satisfactions; for other judgments, these data are those indubitable constituents of the given which can be described in non-value terms. Terminating judgments predict the occurrence of these data in some specific experience under specific circumstances. Non-terminating judgments assert the probable, objective conditions for such occurrences. But this very consistency, this utterly ruthless effort to make the account of value judgments parallel the account of empirical statements generally, is a source of difficulty. For in order to make value ex-

perience and value judgments conform to the pattern demanded by his epistemology, Lewis neglects to examine esthetic experience in its own terms.

This neglect is evident in Lewis's answers to two fundamental questions of fact. In answer to the first question—what is intrinsic value?—he asserts that intrinsic value is felt satisfaction as a distinct mode of the given. In answer to the second question —what is the nature of an experience of intrinsic value?—he insists that such experience is immediate, final, indubitable, non-cognitive, and non-judgmental. To meet the demands of his epistemology, he must give these answers. If value judgments are to be forms of empirical knowledge on Lewis's theory, they must refer to indubitable data and be based upon these data. Felt satisfaction, as qualitatively identical in all its instances, appears to be the only datum which is at once distinctively esthetic and indubitable. Lewis therefore defines intrinsic value as this felt satisfaction. He insists, not merely that felt satisfactoriness is a necessary condition of any experience of intrinsic value, but that this satisfaction is intrinsic value. In man's valuing activity, felt satisfaction is that for *the sake of which* all is chosen.

But felt satisfaction can not be identified with intrinsic value merely because, if there were such satisfaction, it would be an indubitable datum. The fundamental question is factual, whether or not there is this felt satisfaction and whether or not men do choose all else for the sake of it. And when this question is asked as a question of fact, apart from the demands of an epistemology, Lewis's answer seems clearly false. At the phenomenal level of experience, to which Lewis's analysis refers and for which it claims accuracy, felt satisfaction is not directly and immediately found as a distinct mode of the given. We are not aware of felt satisfaction on the one hand and of the objective constituents of the experience on the other. Strangest of all, Lewis can not consistently hold that, in any experience of intrinsic value, we are aware of these two distinct modes. Insisting that intrinsic value experiences are immediate, non-cognitive, and non-judgmental, he can not claim that any distinction between the two modes is made, except as a consequence of reflection upon the experience. Surely, in order to think clearly about value experience as a phenomenal occurrence and in order to direct and control experience for the more adequate realization of value, a distinction must be made between the more and less stable elements, between the "objective" and the "emotional" aspects of the phenomenally given. But both aspects are present together and are not in fact distinguished in the immediacy of the esthetic experience. Indeed,

Lewis insists that both aspects are present together and that it would not be "sensible" to expect the occurrence of the emotional aspect in the absence of objective constituents (p. 369). In short, the most that Lewis has shown and can show is two aspects which are distinguishable. He can insist upon the cognitive and moral significance of making the distinction. He can not hold that this distinction necessarily is made in the intrinsic value experience nor that intrinsic value is necessarily to be identified with one of the distinguishable aspects to the exclusion of the other.

To define intrinsic value as a kind of experience, properly examined at the phenomenal level, is to direct attention to what occurs at this level in this kind of experience. But when we direct our attention in the manner required, we need not find ourselves aware of any felt satisfaction as such and as distinct from what is apprehended as satisfactory. What is intrinsically good, when it is, may be the music of Benjamin Britten as heard and a novel of Camus as read. Music may be heard and novels may be read without our finding them good. What is lacking on these occasions may very well be a distinctive kind of feeling suffusing the experience. But when we choose to hear Britten or read Camus, we do not necessarily do so merely for the sake of this feeling. We may and do often choose to hear or to read for the sake of an experience in which the hearing and the reading is an indispensable and undistinguished part. Intrinsic value is then properly attributed to what is heard or read or seen as satisfactory in some specific manner. If it is legitimate at all to apply the "intrinsic-extrinsic" terminology to the distinguishable parts of an intrinsic value experience, any part taken by itself must be said to have extrinsic value only. Intrinsic value is attributed to the whole as a whole of specific parts. Lewis is simply and seriously mistaken in identifying intrinsic value with but one of the two distinguishable aspects of esthetic experience.

The second question of fact, which Lewis fails adequately to answer, concerns the cognitive status of intrinsic value experience. His inadequacy here—his failure to examine whether intrinsic value experience is non-cognitive, non-judgmental, and final—is largely a consequence of his confidence in the truth of his definition of intrinsic value. For if intrinsic value is conceived as felt satisfaction, then any cognitive element in esthetic experience may be dismissed as concerned merely with the objective and extrinsic rather than the emotional and intrinsic aspect of it. If, on the other hand, intrinsic value were not felt satisfaction as distinct from the objective constituents of the experience, then any cognitive element in esthetic experience might be present in the

experience as esthetic. And this would be very embarrassing to a theory of value judgments which require uninterpreted, immediate, final, and indubitable data. But embarrassing or not, at least some esthetic experiences are cognitive. They are cognitive in the sense that both recall and anticipation are indispensable to them and are present in such a way that one can know when expectation has been disappointed.

Lewis, himself, quite adequately describes an esthetic experience which is cognitive:

> A musical composition or rendition discloses a kind of value which comes as near to being purely esthetic and directly found in the experience of it as one could well discover. . . . One does not hear the symphony in its opening passage, nor in the middle of the second movement, nor in the finale: one hears it and appreciates it as a progressive and cumulative whole. . . . If one cannot stay through the second movement, one prefers to leave at the end of the first. And if by some accident, the rendition should be broken off in the middle, one would 'lose more than half the value' of it: indeed one might find this interrupted rendition a musically unsatisfactory experience altogether, and regret hearing any of it under the circumstances. [Pp. 396-397.]

But if experiences of intrinsic value were non-cognitive, indubitable, and final, then it would surely be unreasonable on the occasion of an interrupted performance to regret hearing the first half of a symphony. Yet Lewis is quite correct: we do regret occasions of this kind. We do find it unsatisfactory to experience but half of a symphony, and we do regret "bad breaks" between any two sides of a symphonic recording. While refusing to admit any element of cognition *in* the esthetic experience itself, Lewis provides a rational warrant for the regret by asserting that experiences of this kind are temporal gestalts, where the value of the whole is no mere sum of experienced values. Thus "more than half the value" will be lost, or may be lost, where the experience is interrupted at midpoint. Lewis makes no attempt to define midpoint in a temporal gestalt, but presumably the effect described here can occur wherever and whenever an experience of this kind is interrupted. For example, it might be more disastrous to interrupt some musical renditions ten bars from the end than to interrupt others fifty bars from the end; still, any interruption might be musically unsatisfactory. Lewis's explanation, however, is insufficient. On Lewis's theory concerning the nature of value experience, the value actually realized in hearing any portion of the symphony is final and indubitable. Such value can not be canceled out by any interruption. In fact, Lewis's explanation covers only one trivial kind of case: where, having heard a symphony numerous times in the past, we do know of an interrupted performance that we have missed something, and know what it is

we have missed. Yet our feeling of regret and dissatisfaction is not dependent upon prior acquaintance with the work in question. Hearing some radically new composition for the first time, we should still be disappointed with an interrupted rendition. In all such experiences, there is some expectation of specific values to be realized in the whole. There is some apprehension of structure and form in accordance with which the experience must develop. When the experience does not develop in this way, either because it is interrupted or because it develops in some different manner, there is disappointment. In at least many of these cases, we are not merely aware of disappointment. We are also aware of the nature of it. We can say, for example, what in general we did anticipate. Surely, in these cases, there is an element of judgment and cognition. It is perhaps intuitive in some sense. The judgment may be exceedingly vague and difficult to formulate in language. Still, there is some awareness of, and some concern for, the future and the whole of this kind of experience. And it is in such awareness and concern that Lewis finds what is characteristic of cognition and the moral attitude.

Lewis's difficulty here is most obvious in the cases of experiences which are temporal gestalts, where the temporal order in which distinguishable elements are experienced is an essential condition of the esthetic experience. But in any experience which is a gestalt, in the sense of an organically integrated whole of internally related elements, cognition and judgment may be present. There may be some intuitive apprehension of structure, pattern, and form, and some concern that this pattern shall be realized in the experience as a whole. For example, the temporal order in which the various aspects of a sculpture are experienced may make no difference to the nature of the esthetic experience as a whole. Nevertheless, at given times in such an experience, there is an experienced part and an expected whole, recall of the past and anticipation of the future, awareness of the part and concern for the whole. In respect of what is recalled and what is anticipated, the data present at any moment are interpreted. Specific expectations are formed and may be disappointed. Time as such is probably unimportant in any of these cases. Lewis's talk about "concern for the future" merely makes it more appropriate to employ this language. What surely is important is that some of the more interesting and complicated cases of esthetic experience are relational, that the occurrence of the esthetic experience in part depends upon the discernment of specific relations, and that judgment is in the process of formation within an experience where such relations are being discerned.

Judgment is not, as Lewis insists, something which occurs only *after* the esthetic experience is complete. A final judgment of an esthetic experience must of course await the completion of the experience. To point this out is utterly trivial. It is not equivalent to denying the presence of judgment and cognition in the esthetic experience itself. In esthetic experience of many kinds, reason is already in the room of consciousness; it simply is not locked outside waiting to get its foot in the door.

Lewis, then, is mistaken on two fundamental questions of fact. In order to discover in value experience the indubitable and uninterpreted data required by his epistemology, he has paradoxically been forced to interpret esthetic experiences in accordance with the demands of this epistemology. In the whole of Lewis's analysis, there is no genuine effort to examine value experience apart from epistemological presuppositions. There is no attempt to consider the kinds of judgment which men of cultivated taste do make and do verify. Lewis's theory is simply *ad hoc*, interesting to those who find his epistemology persuasive but quite false when subjected to any test which does not assume this theory of knowledge.

IV

But, it may quite properly be objected, the function of an esthetics is not to provide answers to questions of fact. Because questions of fact are scientific rather than philosophical, an esthetics might give mistaken answers to such questions and still be interesting and fruitful as an esthetics. Thus, if my criticism were merely a disclosure of scientific errors, it might well be philosophically trivial.

My criticism, however, focuses upon questions of fact only in order to reveal a logical difficulty with important consequences for esthetics as a philosophical study. The logical problem is concerned with the justification for applying to esthetic experience such descriptive terms as "non-cognitive," "immediate," "final," and "non-judgmental." Under what conditions could the application of these terms be logically justified? Clearly the application of these terms can not be justified by any presumption in favor of the general applicability of Lewis's theory of knowledge which requires that empirical statements refer to indubitable data. Not only is there no general presumption in favor of the occurrence of indubitable data in experience about which we might wish to make empirical statements; but Lewis himself admits, as decisive evidence against the general applicability of his theory of knowledge, that ethical judgments are not empirical statements as these

are accounted for on his epistemology. But if there is no presumption in favor of the general applicability of Lewis's epistemology and the occurrence of the required indubitable data, then the justification for applying to esthetic experience such terms as "immediate" and "final" must be an appeal to matters of fact. I have shown that the facts do not support this appeal. In consequence, no logically adequate justification can be provided. Lewis's account of empirical statements, whether or not it is adequate for the purposes of science, can be applied to neither esthetic nor ethical judgments.

The issue raised here has important consequences for esthetics. If it were possible to justify a description of esthetic experience as immediate, indubitable, final, and non-cognitive, then all further esthetic questions would be scientific—psychological, sociological, and physiological investigations of the conditions under which ineffable and qualitatively identical value experiences occur. If, on the other hand, there is sufficient justification for describing esthetic experiences as in some sense cognitive, judgmental, mediate, and tentative; then philosophers have still to make clear and precise in just what sense or senses this is so, and they have still to provide philosophically adequate accounts of esthetic judgments.

STUART M. BROWN, JR.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

RELATIONAL PROPERTIES AS QUALITIES IN PROFESSOR LEWIS'S THEORY OF VALUE[1]

PROFESSOR C. I. Lewis, in his work *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, has expounded an affective theory of value that will undoubtedly be a landmark in the history of the subject. Professor Lewis has accepted consistently the doctrine that experience is ultimately the final arbiter of value, and has carried it out to its logical conclusion: no *thing* is good in itself; it is only good as a means for the immediate or eventual production of a valuable experience (which is the only thing that is *intrinsically* good). Value in objects is *extrinsic* only: extrinsic values are potentialities for the realization of intrinsically valuable experiences.

I believe the theory is impaired by Professor Lewis's attempts to ascribe a greater amount of "objectivity" to the extrinsic values resident in objects than is consistent with certain facts of experience, and this, I believe, is accomplished through a confusion re-

[1] In the preparation of this paper I have been greatly aided by the suggestions and criticisms of Professor Philip Blair Rice. The faults of the paper, however, are my own.

sulting in a contradiction. Intrinsic value is designated as a quality of experience, but extrinsic value is defined as a relational property, or, more precisely, as a dispositional property: extrinsic values are rendered significant only by potential relation to a valuing subject. Yet Professor Lewis, at times, tends to speak of extrinsic values as if they were *qualities* of objects, or at least as if they were dispositional (relational) properties that are independent of a valuing subject. Passages like this: "Evaluations of things are objective and cognitive, and are not relative to particular persons or circumstances or occasions in any fashion which differentiates them from attributions of other properties to objects" (p. 458), or this: "A value property so specified is not relative to any *particular* experience . . . but is an independent character of the thing, inasmuch as any particular experience may fail to be indicative of the character of experience in general to which it is capable of conducing" (p. 458), illustrate this tendency. This tendency occurs most markedly in Chapter XVII, "Value in Objects." There Professor Lewis describes the basic mode of extrinsic value as a "simple potentiality." He culls an example of this simple potentiality from the natural sciences: "If this salt should be put in water it would dissolve." For Lewis "the if-then statement is true whether the hypothesis in it is true or not. Hence this property of solubility is a potentiality of salt" (p. 513). Similarly with value hypotheticals: "If this object be presented in experience, it will induce the experiencing subject to have an intrinsically valuable experience." The truth of this if-then statement is likewise independent of the truth of the hypothesis, and the extrinsic value property resides in the object whether or not the object is ever experienced. This latter example, like the former, is in the mode of simple potentiality; the object has the extrinsic value property, it has the potentiality for conducing to some possible intrinsically valuable experience, independently of its ever being experienced by anyone.

Professor Lewis explains that much of the bewildered thinking concerning "objectivity" *versus* "subjectivity" in value matters rests upon the confusion of this mode of simple potentiality with another mode, the mode of "value-in-fact."

> Values truly attributable in this mode of simple potentiality are objective *values*. They are in the "object independently of any relation to a subject" in exactly the same sense as its size or color or any other objective property. Second, there are attributions of such potentiality as realizable under certain conditions, known or assumed as *actual* or determined to be probable. . . . We shall speak of this as value-attribution in the *mode of actuality* and of the value ascribed as *value-in-fact* . . . value-in-fact presumes the simple potentiality for value-realization as a property of the object, but adds to this the stipula-

tion that certain conditions of the realization of this value in experience must be actual or at least probable. Thus objective value is essential to but not sufficient for value-in-fact. [P. 520.]

It is because of the variation from person to person that an object which genuinely has "objective" value—in the mode of simple potentiality—may not produce a value experience in certain persons. This is one reason for the charge of subjectivity. (It is imperative for us to note here that, as Professor Garvin has pointed out,[2] Lewis assigns to the term "objective" three largely independent meanings, and he uses these meanings, at times, interchangeably. A property is objective (1) in so far as it gives rise to a reliable belief (p. 408), or (2) in so far as the experiences which confirm the property are those of normal human beings whose capacities of apprehension are common to humans in general (p. 416), or (3) in so far as the property is truly a property of the object independently of its actually being apprehended or confirmed by anyone (p. 392, footnote), or, in similar vein, in so far as the property is in the object independently of any relation to a subject (p. 520). It is this third sense, I believe, that Professor Lewis means in his exposition of simple potentiality, and consequently it is this third sense that I shall mean when I use the term "objective property.")

What I should like to suggest is that while the mode of simple potentiality is adequate for the imputation to objects of properties which are genuinely objective (in our third sense), it is not adequate in the case of extrinsic values, and of some of the other properties which Professor Lewis considers objective. Lewis forgets that there are, from the epistemological standpoint, two general types of relations which stand out from the various relations exhibited in the universe. It is the confusion of these two relational types, based upon the failure to distinguish between them because of their expression in the same logical form, which is, I believe, the basis for the misunderstandings to which Professor Lewis's theory may give rise. These general types are (1) relations between or among objects, which relations exist, actually or potentially, independently of their realization in experience, and (2) relations which exist, actually or potentially, between or among objects and experiencing subjects. The hypothetical, "If this salt should be put in water [perhaps by a mechanical agent], it would dissolve," is of the first type. Salt does have the dispositional property of being soluble in water independently of its ever being put in water, and independently of anyone's experiencing salt put

[2] Lucius Garvin, "Relativism in Professor Lewis's Theory of Esthetic Value," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVI (1949), pp. 169–176.

in water. It is true that the hypothetical is an elliptical formulation—there are the implicit assumptions that the salt is of a certain grade of purity, that the water is not already saturated, that the temperature of the water is high enough, etc.—but all that this indicates is that the dispositional property of solubility of salt relative to water is not a simple dyadic relation, but is polyadic. To be sure, the verification of this hypothetical requires that it be related to a knowing organism, but we may, by what I think is a quite legitimate act of faith, maintain that the truth of the hypothetical is independent of any relation to a knowing subject. The truth that the relation would hold is independent of the truth of the antecedent clause; we can, in the mode of simple potentiality, assign the objective property of solubility in water to salt.

However it is obvious that value hypotheticals, by Professor Lewis's definition, belong to the second relational type. The dispositional property of extrinsic value is always relative to a valuer, to an experiencing sentient subject, and not to some disembodied Experience. We can not, in the mode of simple potentiality, assign the objective property of goodness to an object, for extrinsic values are not "in the object independently of any relation to a subject." They are, by definition, relative (potentially) to a subject, and by the definitions of extrinsic value and of the mode of simple potentiality value hypotheticals must be excluded from that mode. Not only must extrinsic values be excluded from that mode, but also many of the other properties which Professor Lewis labels objective, e.g., redness, softness—properties which in some theories of knowledge are called "secondary." These too are dispositional properties, when resident in objects, but in order that these properties be rendered significant they must be related (actually or potentially) not to other objects or other properties of objects, or perhaps not only to other objects, but also to experiencing subjects. I believe that the key phrase of the passage " 'independently of any relation to a subject' *in exactly the same sense as it size or color or any other objective property,*" is that part which I have italicized. If all properties and qualities of objects are thus jumbled we can make little headway. The size of an object is either a quality of that object or it is a relational property of that object—the object has a certain size *en soi* or relatively to or in comparison with certain other objects; few would say that its size was dependent upon a relation to an organism that is capable of determining sizes. But it is at least debatable that colors in objects are dependent, actually or potentially, upon relation to an organism capable of discerning colors. To be sure, the *potentiality* as such is resident in the object independently of relation to a subject, but potentialities or disposi-

tional properties are relational properties, and not simple qualities, as Professor Lewis tends to speak of them in the section on simple potentiality. And an attempt to treat relational properties as if they were qualities is a logical contradiction resulting in absurdities.

It is my contention that in consideration of value properties what is needed is something midway between the modes of simple potentiality and value relative to persons; we must recognize not a simple, but rather a complex or relational potentiality [3] between valuable object and experiencing (or capable of experiencing) subject. We can not say that an extrinsic value property resides in an object without explicitly or implicitly including the potentiality which the subject contributes to the realization of the relation.

I believe that the aforementioned inconsistency results from Professor Lewis's employment of two interrelated notions which require more clarification than can be given to them here: (1) The treatment of the extrinsic value property resident in objects as a property separate from the other properties of objects, and (2) The comparative disregard of the importance of the potentiality which the subject must contribute if the value relation is to be realized.

(1) It is somewhat difficult to deal with this aspect of Professor Lewis's thought inasmuch as he is inconsistent on this topic throughout the book. On the one hand we have statements like this: ". . . the conception of extrinsic value as a potentiality for conducing to certain positive value-qualities in experience, represents esthetic or inherent value in an object as an independent property of it; one which like other properties, is tested by experience . . ." (p. 459), and ". . . other properties than value are likewise interpretable as potentialities in the object for leading to experiences of a predictable kind" (p. 461). On the other hand we have statements that seem to convey the impression that value properties, far from being separate properties of objects, are derived from the other properties; e.g., ". . . there are two distinguishable parts or aspects of any sensible intent or purpose. There is expectation of some result describable in terms other than those of value; and there is ascription of comparative value to this anticipated result" (p. 369), and ". . . although the value-quality thus directly characterizing a presentation, has the same character of immediate datum as does the presentation itself, this *value-quality is not simply a function of the presentation, but tends to be determined in some part by the relation of that presentation to the context of it*" (p. 426).

Although these two quotations are at least partially inconsist-

[3] For this terminology I am specifically indebted to Professor Rice.

ent, I believe the general tenor of Professor Lewis's work is to regard extrinsic values as properties separate from and other than the other properties and qualities of objects, and I believe that this is at least part of the reason why Professor Lewis tends to fall into the inconsistency of treating extrinsic values as if they were simple qualities. If value properties of objects have exactly the same status as other properties, then difficulties arise as to why these extrinsic values are not apprehended as generally as the other qualities and properties, and because Professor Lewis is so rightly insistent on making value *judgments* empirically confirmable, he is forced to treat the extrinsic value property of an object as if it were independent of relation to a subject, and if the property is not apprehended generally it is because many subjects are not "experts" in these matters.[4] It is my own belief that extrinsic values are not properties of objects of the same order as most other properties, but are rather a function of or property of the other properties. This would, when other factors are taken into consideration, help to explain why some persons perceive a value property resident in some objects and others can not. It would also explain why many persons could agree on the specific qualities and properties of an object, and still disagree about the extrinsic value of that object.

One of the reasons that might be adduced in support of the notion that extrinsic values are "tertiary" qualities might be the findings of recent neurological research. We do not, *psych*ologically speaking, know much about happiness, joy, pleasure, liking, or whatever the affectivist defines or designates as the intrinsic good. However, we do know enough about the physiological and neurological concomitants of pleasure to advance a fairly plausible theory as to why extrinsic values are "tertiary." Through the work of Adrian, Lashley, and others we know that pleasure (or the more neutral term "positive hedonic tone") accompanies the smooth and regular transmission of neural impulses between certain cyclic limits; we also know that pleasure does not have its physiological concomitant in the sensory or afferent nerves but is rather a summation effect in the higher nerve centers. However, qualities and properties of objects *are* given to the cortex through the afferent nerves within a very wide range of impulses per second. Thus it is that when a yellow object is presented to two persons, one of them may, through conditioning or association, respond affectively to the stimulus by initiating his own cortical impulses[5] which blend with the

[4] P. 526 (although this is contradicted on p. 452).

[5] For the possibility of this, there is the evidence of the "closed chains" of central neural activity demonstrated by Rafael Lorente de Nó in the *Journal of Neurophysiology* for 1938 and 1939.

sensory impulses to produce the summation effect in the higher nerve centers; whereas the other person may not respond affectively. One of them may feel pleasure or hedonic tone when beholding the object, and the other may not, *but for both of them the object will be perceived as yellow.*

The potentiality for conducing to an intrinsically valuable experience may be a function of a single property, or a combination of properties, or the object as a whole, but in any case I think that it is important to recognize that extrinsic values are properties of properties—which is another way of stating that the other contributor to the relation, the subject, must contribute more to the realization of the value relation than is the case with some other non-value properties. And this brings us to the second related point.

(2) Professor Lewis sometimes speaks of the importance attached to the recognition that the subject contributes something to the realization of the value relation (p. 409), but most of the time, obsessed with his preoccupation with extrinsic values as "qualities," Professor Lewis tends to minimize the other side of the relation. Extrinsic values and other like dispositional properties of things are, in the complex or relational potentiality which I propose, one side of the relation, the other side of which consists in a potentiality for the contribution to the experience of the relation in a subject. Thus, the relation of yellowness in experience would hold if an object which had the potentiality for contributing to the realization of yellowness in experience were presented to a subject who also had the potentiality for contributing to this relation. The relation would not hold if an object which had the potentiality were presented to a subject who did not have this potentiality, say a blind man or a newly born baby. Neither would the relation hold if an object that did not have the potentiality were presented to a subject who did have the potentiality, nor would it hold if an object that did not have the potentiality were presented to a subject who likewise did not have the potentiality.

Even within the mode of complex potentiality, the potentiality or nonpotentiality in the object or subject exists independently of the actual relation—though of course it is always with implicit reference to the other term of the relation. The existence of the dispositional property may be predicted, and it may be confirmed or disconfirmed with a greater or lesser degree of probability. Even so, Professor Lewis says, there is nothing to suggest that extrinsic values are uniquely different from other properties.

> We may well believe that the likeability and dislikeability of things; their directly gratifying quality or the opposite; is more dependent on the individual than is seeing green or feeling hard; not only in that there is more variation from person to person in the matter of likes and dislikes, but also in that for the same person, there is more variation from time to time. Further, our prizings and disprizings seem to be more affected by orientation and attitude: one may find a thing more or less enjoyable, according to the manner in which one goes out to meet it.
>
> It will be admitted, however, that the differences in our value findings from other aspects of experience, in such respects, is one of degree rather than of kind. [P. 418.]

We may readily accept Lewis's contention that certain value expressions are empirically confirmable judgments without accepting the doctrine that extrinsic values have the same status as most other properties. In the case of extrinsic values as compared with these other properties, I believe that the difference *is* one of kind rather than of degree. Though the object to which is ascribed the property of extrinsic value remain unchanged, through any given period of time, the "fluctuations" of the subject, his change from the property of having to not having the potentiality for the contribution to the realization of the value relation in experience, and then his change back to the state of having the potentiality, and also the variations between subjects of different races, cultures, etc., make the prediction that the value relation will hold, at times, extremely uncertain of confirmation, as contrasted with prediction of other experiential relations involving some other dispositional properties of existents. That there is a difference in the probability that these various relations will hold does not trouble Professor Lewis.

> Those who would think to discover an absolute difference between value apprehensions as flatly relative to the individual and other empirical findings as unqualifiedly universal and common, must obviously be very thoughtless or excessively naive. Other characteristics of the discerned-presented are also affected by differences in the individual capacity to apprehend as well as by our different conditioning and differences of attitude. These, likewise, vary in measure from one person to another in the presence of the same objects, and from one moment to another in the experience of the individual. [P. 418.]

Like any good empiricist, Professor Lewis accepts the Humian analysis that our knowledge of "matters of fact" is merely probable and never certain, and hence he concludes that because our knowledge (confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of a prediction) of an extrinsic value ascribed to an object is merely probable, it therefore differs not at all from our knowledge of other properties; our knowledge being in the latter case likewise only probable. Now I am not so "thoughtless or excessively naïve" as to believe

that our knowledge of dispositional properties other than extrinsic values is certain, nor do I believe that all humans will perceive the property of, say, yellowness in a "really" yellow object. What I do believe is that almost all persons will perceive yellow in a yellow object, but in many value situations many persons will not perceive a value property (i.e., will not respond affectively to the value property) which is considered, perhaps even by an "expert" in such matters, to reside in a given object. The prediction that the value relation will hold is, in many cases, attended by a much lesser degree of probability than is the case with predictions concerning some other dispositional properties, and I believe that this discrepancy points to a genuine difference in kind. It is extremely difficult if not impossible, on theoretical grounds, to determine just when a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, but in the light of the practical difficulties pointed out above, and in the light of certain facts such as the neurological, I think that we may advance considerably further along the road to basic agreement in value theory if extrinsic values are treated as different in kind from some other properties, that is, if they are treated as properties of properties, as "tertiary."

It is possible that Professor Lewis might accept much if not all of this, inasmuch as some of the passages quoted above show that the theory is at least open to such an interpretation, and inasmuch as the theory remains, after these considerations, essentially intact.

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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

VERIFIABILITY IN HISTORY: A REPLY TO MISS MASI

In the opinion of Professor Lewis, most empirical assertions are non-terminating, that is, exhaustively translatable into an infinitely large number of terminating, decisively verifiable judgments. He meets the objection of those who would exclude historical judgments from the class of non-terminating judgments by explaining that the equivalence of an empirical assertion and its correlated infinite set of terminating judgments is an equivalence of intensional meaning rather than of objective reference, requiring only that equivalent statements be deducible from each other. Hence, it may be granted that, in Lewis's words, "The past just can't be identified with the present or future, or with anything

that anybody can any longer experience."[1] Nevertheless, the inclusion of historical sentences in the class of non-terminating judgments remains possible, provided only that the requirement of intensional equivalence is fulfilled.

Illustrating the meaning of intensional equivalence, Lewis says, "For example, if anyone ask us, 'What does it mean that it was Monday yesterday?', we might reply, 'It means that it will be Wednesday tomorrow.'" . . . "One who . . . said that 'It was Monday yesterday' and 'It will be Wednesday tomorrow' have the same meaning—have the same logical consequences and are each deducible from the other—would not be asserting that yesterday is tomorrow or Monday is the same day as Wednesday" (p. 198).

Miss Masi, agreeing with Lewis that "statements about present objective fact" *can* be successfully analyzed into series of infinite numbers of "predictive statements which would verify the objective statement,"[2] argues that Lewis's analysis is inapplicable to historical sentences. Her basic argument is that intensional equivalence is demonstrable only analytically within a logical system, and thus has no relation to empirical historical investigation, where determination of synthetic information is required to relate any historical sentence to its verificatory sentences, and in which, therefore, mutual deducibility is impossible.

Offering a counter example of a historical sentence, "Caesar was assassinated," and some of its verificatory sentences, "If I read Plutarch's *Lives*, I would read his account of Caesar's death," "If I looked under 'Julius Caesar' in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, I would read of his assassination," and "If . . . , I . . . *ad inf.*," she observes:

> The truth of the verifying statements is not deducible from "Caesar was assassinated" but is contingent on a great number of empirical eventualities —in the first example, that Plutarch existed, that he wrote the *Lives*, that the book is extant, and that I exist, etc.
>
> Still less could one deduce from "If I read Plutarch's *Lives*, I would read his account of Caesar's death," the truth of the statement "Caesar was assassinated,"—it could conceivably have happened that Caesar really committed suicide and that Plutarch's account is not true. [P. 672.]

To support her view that Lewis's analysis *is* valid for "statements about present objective fact," Miss Masi offers the example of the statement, "This is an apple," and some of its verificatory sentences, "If I bite it, it will taste sweet," "If I apply certain

[1] C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court Publishing Co., 1946, p. 197. All quotations from Lewis in this paper are taken from this book.

[2] Evelyn Masi, "A Note on Lewis's Analysis of the Meaning of Historical Statements," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLVI (1949), pp. 670–674.

chemicals to it, certain specific results will occur," and "If I . . . , . . . *ad inf.*" Interpreting this example, she comments:

> The important point to note here is that all these predictions signify procedures which directly verify the original objective statement. . . . One has the opportunity of undertaking direct action and obtaining immediate and conclusive verification of the empirical statement. [P. 674.]

As a preliminary comment on Miss Masi's assertion of the validity of Lewis's analysis for statements of present objective fact, it may be questioned whether the distinction she draws between such statements and historical statements is not irrelevant. If her argument against Lewis's analysis of historical sentences is based on the empirical connection between such sentences and their verificatory sentences, and, hence, the lack of mutual deducibility between them, then it would seem that these considerations hold with the same force against Lewis's analysis of present statements. Certainly, for instance, the relation between "This is an apple" and "If I apply certain chemicals to it, certain specific results will occur" would not usually be construed as more analytic than the relation between "Caesar was assassinated" and "If I read Plutarch's *Lives*, I would read his account of Caesar's death." And if, according to Miss Masi, the truth of the verifying statement in the latter example "is contingent on a great number of empirical eventualities," including "that I exist," why should not the truth of the verifying statement in the former example be taken as similarly contingent, i.e., that these chemicals are the ones referred to, that I am applying them correctly, that the law stating the effect of these chemicals on apples is correct, and equally—"that I exist"?

In any event, no attempt is made by Miss Masi to demonstrate how the crucial criterion of mutual deducibility obtains in the case of present statements, while it is apparent that her consideration of the "opportunity of undertaking direct action" to directly verify the present statement is completely irrelevant in the absence of such demonstration. Moreover, a consideration of the sentence, "This was an apple five minutes ago," indicates that the criterion of directness and immediacy, if at all meaningful, may not be clearly irrelevant even in historical investigation.

Miss Masi's main contention is the lack of mutual deducibility between a historical sentence and its verificatory sentences. Although she recognizes such mutual deducibility as Lewis's *definition* of equal signification of the same state of affairs, she introduces a secondary argument, which would obviously have no force were Lewis's claim of mutual deducibility granted. "The state of affairs indicated by the objective statement and that by

the verification," she says, "are different since the objective realities of which the states of affairs are but limited aspects are different" (p. 673). Besides being irrelevant to Lewis's formal definition of equal signification of the same state of affairs as intensional equivalence, this argument is independently invalid. It entails the consequence that no two objects may ever be said to be similar. For, in order to be declared to be two at all, any two objects must be different in some sense. Were this difference to preclude a limited similarity in some respects, no similarity could ever be spoken of at all, but only identity or diversity. If, on the other hand, Lewis's formal definition of signification of the same state of affairs as mutual deducibility is strictly held to as the basis for discussion, then Miss Masi's secondary argument loses its whole point.

So far, however, her fundamental argument has not been evaluated. A preliminary criticism must first be made. According to Miss Masi, Lewis's original example of the equivalence of "Yesterday was Monday" and "Tomorrow will be Wednesday" is exclusively analytic, while her example of a historical sentence is exclusively empirical. This sharp contrast is overstated, in the opinion of the present writer. The syntactic connection between "Yesterday was Monday" and "Tomorrow will be Wednesday" would be useless in confirming the former, as a historical assertion, were it not possible to fulfill the semantic conditions for assertion of the latter. And the necessity of determining the "empirical eventualities" in the case of "Caesar was assassinated" should not obscure the fact that, were there no laws from which, together with certain singular statements, others could be analytically deduced, we should be left with only these singular, and in themselves irrelevant, sentences, rather than with verificatory ones. In our case, if it could not be assumed that the assassination of important figures is recorded by contemporary writers, in what way would reading an account of Caesar's death in Plutarch's *Lives* be even a partial confirmation of "Caesar was assassinated," or failing to find such an account be even a partial disconfirmation?

What, then, is the difference between the two cases, if any? This difference must be located in the possibility of synthetic control of the rules of inference in each case, by the relevant sentences. In Lewis's case, the rules governing the inference from "Yesterday was Monday" to "Tomorrow will be Wednesday" are conjointly definitive of the meanings of both sentences. This dependence of the sentence-meanings upon the rules precludes synthetic control of the rules by the sentences. In Miss Masi's case, however, the meanings of the historical sentence and its verificatory sentences

are independent of the rules governing the inference from one to the other, hence allowing synthetic control of the rules by the sentences. According to the first case, then, the non-terminating classes of terminating judgments correlated with empirical assertions may be deduced from these empirical assertions by means of metalinguistic devices alone, and without synthetic considerations (case A). In the second case, however, a set of "empirical laws" must be additionally assumed in order to enable deduction of these non-terminating consequences of empirical assertions (case B).

Miss Masi's basic argument, as above refined and reformulated, may then be analyzed into the following contentions:

1. Lewis considers only case A (basing the equivalence of an assertion and its verifying consequences on mutual deducibility).
2. Case A is never historically relevant but only case B.
3. Case B is never characterized by mutual deducibility.
4. Hence, the equivalence of a historical assertion and its verifying consequences can not be asserted on Lewis's grounds, resulting in "a breach between the meaning of an historical statement and its modes of verification" (p. 674).

The first contention, i.e., that Lewis considers only case A, seems justified. According to him, "The implication, by a statement of objective fact, of the terminating judgments which represent its particular possible confirmations . . . is like the implication of 'Today is Friday' by 'Yesterday was Thursday.' "[3] If it is indeed true, as here maintained, that verification in any case, present as well as historical, takes place by means of "empirical laws" (case B), as well as by confirmation of analytically derived predictions (case A), then Lewis's omission is more serious than Miss Masi thinks it. For, while she is ready to grant the adequacy of his analysis of present sentences, it is here maintained that historical and present sentences are no different with respect to verification.

Miss Masi's second contention, i.e., that case A is never historically relevant, is incompatible with her agreement with Lewis on present sentences. For, if analysis of a present sentence *s* can yield a predictive sentence *p*, the anomaly is surely no less than "the anomaly of a past event being signified by future events" (p. 671). For, when *p* is verified, the state of affairs denoted by *s* is, by definition, past. Thus, if it were not possible to say that a new historical sentence *s1*, denoting the same state of affairs as *s*, but in the past tense, were being confirmed by *p*, then no present sentence *s* could

[3] Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

ever be verifiable by analytically deriving an infinite set of terminating judgments.

Taking Miss Masi's third contention, i.e., that case B is never characterized by mutual deducibility, it has already been observed that deducibility in at least one direction is a *sine qua non* for making any prediction on the basis of an empirical assertion. Of course, any given "empirical law" may be disconfirmed in the future and thus the predictions based on it are not guaranteed as to certain truth. But, unless they follow necessarily from the law and its given instantial conditions, the law could never even be tested. To assert on this basis the existence of deducibility in the opposite direction also, however, would be to commit the fallacy of simple conversion. Generally speaking, the same effect may be the result of more than one cause. Consider, however, one set of conditions *c1*, relative to an indefinite number of relevant laws *s1*. Let us call all the consequences deduced from *c1* with the help of *s1*, 1, 2, 3, . . . indefinitely. Now, consider a second set of conditions *c2*, relative to an indefinite number of laws relevant to it (either including or excluding *s1*), called *s2*. Suppose, now, that as the consequences are deduced from *c2* with the aid of *s2*, they turn out to be exactly the same as the series deduced from *c1*, i.e., 1, 2, 3, . . . indefinitely, and only these. Of course, there is no formal assurance that this identity will continue indefinitely, as there is no formal assurance that the laws are true. But one variant of pragmatism (Whatever is different must make a difference) seems to the writer to assert that in such a case, *c1* having the same empirical consequences as *c2* for an infinite set, *c1* is identical with *c2*. This assertion would, in all actual finite cases, amount to a methodological resolution to seek an empirical connection between *c1* and *c2*, in the degree that they have empirical consequences in common, and relative to the diversity of the laws with the aid of which these consequences are deduced. Another way of putting the matter would be to consider the indefinitely long series *m* of consequences of *c1* deduced for an indefinitely long time with the aid of the indefinitely increasing set of all known relevant laws, *s1*. As *m* approaches infinity, the likelihood decreases (in some sense of likelihood) that *c2* is different from *c1*, though this formal possibility remains. Hence, though the nonterminating series *m* does not define *c1*, it has, on this view, as an infinite series, an individual relation to *c1*, which enables deducibility from the infinite series to *c1*. Thus, though Plutarch's *Lives* might not in itself convince one of Caesar's assassination, if one read similar accounts in diverse histories, and confirmed the statement in different ways, in combination with different "empirical laws," one would with increasing assurance assert that event.

Considering Miss Masi's final conclusion that a breach remains between the meaning of a historical statement and its modes of verification, and Lewis's answer, one may still feel dissatisfied that the pragmatist answer has removed the paradox. In the opinion of the writer, the genuine and valid source of this dissatisfaction is the explication of the meaning of "Caesar died" in terms of events occurring today and tomorrow, thus omitting quite an important "chunk of reality," i.e., all related events intervening between the historical event asserted and the activity of the historian. But is it necessary to make this omission by starting the non-terminating series today, because of the accidental time-position of the historian? Should not rather the historical assertion be explicated as translatable into a non-terminating series of consequences beginning contemporarily with the event asserted, but possibly, and in most cases demonstrably, prior to the historian? Lewis himself, for instance, seems at times unaware of this crucial point. In one place he writes, "In saying that 'Caesar died' means what would verify it, we also recognize that possession of such theoretically sufficient knowledge is as impossible as it is to turn time backward."[4] But, in another place, he no longer speaks of the meaning of an event as what would verify it, but as what would verify it *to us:* "By depicting the meaning of 'Caesar died' as consisting in what would verify it to us in future possible experience, this conception may be charged with translating what is past into something which is exclusively future. . . . But just what this . . . point is, it is a matter of some difficulty to elicit."[5] Following the analysis above presented, the point seems fairly clear. The reference to "us" is entirely gratuitous, omitting all the events between the historical state of affairs and the historian, and creating the "breach" responsible for our paradox.

For considerations of practical verification by the historian, reference to his own position is important, for it sets the limits to his activity by emphasizing that, though theoretically possible, it is empirically impossible to verify certain of the implied terminating judgments, because such verification would require an observer at a time-point now past. Though the historian may still have an infinite series to work with, he lacks that subset of the series represented by past possible confirmations. Thus, though a present sentence is uncertain because its non-terminating series is, so to speak, open at one end, the historical sentence is doubly uncertain (in two ways) without being more uncertain, for it is open at both ends,

[4] Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

though it still has an infinite number of possible confirmations. But the significance of this practical importance of reference to the historian should not be exaggerated. One illustration will suffice to show (*a*) that indirect verification is possible of a consequence prior to the historian and (*b*) that such consequences are therefore acknowledged in scientific practice, and should be included in the meaning of a historical statement by the verifiability theory: Consider the past event *e1*, with its series of consequences *m*. Let *m'* be that part of the series no longer open to direct confirmation by the historian *H*. It may be important for *H* to recognize the peculiar nature of *m'*, but he must not let that recognition obstruct the indirect confirmation of *m'*: Suppose *m'* to have its own series of consequences *n*, some of which are directly verifiable by *H*, called *n'*. Then, by verifying *n'*, he partially confirms *m'*, thus adding to the confirmation of *e1*, though indirectly. The limited significance of reference to the historian should not be allowed, then, to reduce the scope of meaning of historical sentences, properly defined by the range of all consequences, future to the state of affairs asserted, no matter what the relative time-position of the historian. Such a usage would also yield a constant meaning for historical statements, while the alternative usage would involve a constant change in their meaning with the passage of time. In sum, the following conclusions have been reached here:

(1) Lewis makes a serious omission in considering only the analytic consequences of sentences for purposes of verification.

(2) Explication of the distinction between analytic and empirical consequences of sentences makes it clear that both are relevant in historical verification (contrary to Miss Masi's contention), while no reason is found for distinguishing, as she does, between the verification of present and historical statements.

(3) The mutual deducibility in the case of empirical consequences holds, according to a suggested explication of one variant of pragmatism, between the infinite set of such consequences and the empirical assertion, rather than between a finite set of such consequences and the assertion.

(4) It is suggested that the crucial confusion responsible for the "paradox" of applying the verifiability theory to historical sentences is that between the following sentences:

(*a*) "The meaning of a historical sentence is what would verify it."

(*b*) "The meaning of a historical sentence is what would verify it to us."

The proposal is made to avoid the paradox, follow the historian's practice of indirect confirmation, and guarantee stable meaning for historical sentences by taking option (*a*) above.

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BOOK NOTES

St. Thomas and the Greek Moralists. VERNON J. BOURKE. (The Aquinas Lecture, Spring, 1947). Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1947. 63 pp. $1.50.

In this brief but scholarly essay Professor Bourke is concerned with the character and ingredients of St. Thomas's moral philosophy, as related to the teachings of the ancient moralists. The Thomist moral philosophy is to be found, not in the commentary to Aristotle's *Ethics,* but in a number of St. Thomas's theological treatises. It is, moreover, not a "natural ethics" set side by side with a "supernatural" moral theology, but a single coherent doctrine firmly grounded in St. Thomas's metaphysics. The essay is chiefly devoted to a study of the origins of the materials used by St. Thomas in building his moral philosophy. Aristotelian ethics is shown to have played less than a dominant rôle, while the importance of Stoic influences, as mediated by Roman moralists and the Latin Fathers, is emphasized. The Thomist analysis of the structure of the moral act is shown to have reflected that given by St. John Damascene in his *De fide orthodoxa;* the Thomist theory of right reason as the rule of morality, which functions as the formal principle of St. Thomas's moral philosophy, is traced to Stoicism rather than to Aristotelian sources; and the method of organizing moral problems under the seven virtues, employed in the *Summa theologica,* is held to have been suggested by a treatise *De affectibus* written by a late Greek author named Andronicus, whose own sources were partly Aristotelian and partly Stoic. These Greek materials were fully transformed by St. Thomas into an original and coherent Christian moral philosophy, according to Professor Bourke; but the materials themselves were not, as has often been assumed, purely or primarily Aristotelian, but were more closely related to the tradition of Stoic moral philosophy. The recent tendency of many Thomists to emphasize the differences between St. Thomas and Aristotle, rather than the similarities, is here illustrated in connection with St. Thomas's moral doctrines.

E. A. M.

History and Philosophy and Philosophical Education. ETIENNE GILSON. (The Aquinas Lecture, Fall, 1947.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 1948. 49 pp. $1.50.

This engaging little essay discusses the problem of how a teacher of philosophy can best aid his serious students to become philosophers. While a systematic textbook exposition, such as is offered by the typical scholastic *cursus philosophiae ad mentem Divi Thomae,* may be useful for an initial introductory course, it is no method for educating a student to become a philosopher. In so far as this can be learned at all, it can only be learned by entering into the pursuit of wisdom as a working apprentice to a genuine philosopher. Such genuine philosophers are rarely available in person, but they are accessible, as living intellectual companions, in the writings of great thinkers of the past. Here the apprentice can find his congenial master, whose work he can share. The primary duty of the Professor of Philosophy, therefore, is to help the student to make direct acquaintance with such a first-rate "older brother" in the pursuit of wisdom. And this means, according to Professor Gilson, that the historical approach to philosophy, in advanced courses, is the best method available for helping students to become philosophers; for only by this means can the student make direct contact with the type of philosophic mentor that the professor himself can not, in the normal course of things, hope to be. This whole argument is developed, in this Aquinas Lecture, as an appeal for direct study of the writings of St. Thomas in preference to instruction through neo-scholastic manuals. But the issue raised, and the argument, apply obviously to philosophy in all its traditions and expressions; indeed, the student who finds St. Thomas an uninspiring master should, on Professor Gilson's own showing, look elsewhere to find the flint that will ignite his own spark.

E. A. M.

NEW BOOKS AND CURRENT JOURNALS

Bornemisza, Stephen Th.: The Explanation of Life. The Real Background to Nature. Zürich: Rascher Edition. 272 pp.

Goals for American Education. Ninth Symposium. Edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, R. M. Maciver. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. Distributed by Harper and Brothers. 1950. xiv + 555 pp. $5.00.

Farber, Marvin, editor: Philosophic Thought in France and the United States. Essays Representing Major Trends in Contemporary French and American Philosophy. (University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy.) Buffalo, N. Y.: University of Buffalo. 1950. x + 775 pp. $7.50.

Gemilli, Agostino; Zunini, Giorgio: Introduzione alla Psicologia. Seconda Edizone Riveduta e ampliata. (Pubblicazioni dell' Università Cattolica del' Sacro Cuore, Vol. XX.) Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1949. xv + 490 pp. 1100 lire.

Mariën, Bert: Bibliografia critica degli studi plotiniani, con rassegna delle loro recensioni. Riveduta e curata da V. Cilento. Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli. 1949. 273 pp.

McKenzie, Gordon: Critical Responsiveness. A Study of the Psychological Current in Later Eighteenth-Century Criticism. (University of California Publications in English, Volume 20.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1949. 311 pp.

La Filosofía Latinoamericana contemporanea. Selección y prólogo de Aníbal Sánchez Reulet. Washington, D. C.: Union Panamericana. 1949. 370 pp.

Schilling, Kurt: Geschichte der Philosophie. Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsverlag. 1949. 248 pp. 8.70 D.M.

Van den Daele, Alb.: Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani. Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université. 1941. 154 pp.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM. Vol. VIII, No. 3. Patterns in Events and Patterns in Philosophies of Art: *H. M. Kallen.* The Pleasures of Music. Speculation in British Music Criticism, 1750–1800: *H. M. Schueller.* The Critical Theory of James Joyce: *H. M. Block.* Method in the Study of Literature in Its Relation to the Other Fine Arts: *G. Giovannini.* In Memory of DeWitt H. Parker: *D. N. Morgan.*

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. Volume XLI, Fasc. 1. Cartesio e la politica: *A. Del Noce.* La storia come critica e politica: *G. Morpurgo-Tagliabue.* Studi sulla sofistica: *A. Corsano.* L'oggettivismo-soggettivismo della filosofia moderna; *John Dewey,* a cura di A. Visalberghi. Discussioni—La filosofia dopo Marx: *N. Bobbio.* Filosofia dopo Marx significa uscita dal razionalismo: *F. Balbo.*

ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE. 42e jaargang, Aflevering 2. Het verschil tussen natuur- en geesteswetenschap, benaderd van de kant der natuurwetenschap: *A. G. M. Van Melsen.* Epistemologische beschouwingen over het sociologisch denken: *B. Landheer.* Situationisme: *J. L. Snethlage.* De weg van kosmische orde tot menselijke ordening: *K. Kuypers.*

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